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SOLICITATION: A SUBSTANTIVE CRIME
By JOHN NN. CURRAN*
T should be realized that criminal solicitation involves no physical
harm and that it relates only to cases in which a crime was
projected but never completed. If a person solicited to commit a
crime undertakes the criminal design, the solicitor becomes a party
to the crime, either as accessory or principal and the case is not
within the scope of this subject. The only cases falling within
the purview of this article are those in which the solicited party
(solicitant) has ignored the request of the solicitor. Hence soli-
citation cases of the type of State v. Dumas' in which the parties
were caught flagrante delicto are excluded.
A better understanding of the proposition results if the frame-
work of the subject is observed. Many of the solicitation cases
are bipartite while others are tripartite, but in both classes the
corpus delicti of the crime is the evil intent of the solicitor coupled
with the act of solicitation. If A solicits B to commit adultery
or if A solicits B to murder C, the basic nature of the crime of
solicitation is the same in both instances, although there are two
parties involved in the first case and three in the second.
In the following survey the substantive crime of solicitation
and some aspects of solicitation in reference to criminal attempts
will be considered.
The crime of solicitation has not been exhaustively considered
in the treatises, and the line of demarcation between the criminal
solicitation and the criminal attempt has not been clearly drawn.
An analysis will be made of some of the problems in this branch
of the law for the purpose of ascertaining the cause of present
inconsistencies. Why does one court hold that a solicitation is a
substantive crime and another court deny that doctrine? Why
does a third court rule a solicitation to commit arson is indictable
as an attempt to commit arson and a fourth court decide contrari-
wise? Why on the same set of facts does one court conclude a
criminal solicitation is involved and another court hold that a
criminal attempt is involved and a third court state no crime is
* Professor of Law, De Paul University, Chicago, Ill.
2(1912) 118 Alinn. 77, 136 N. W. 311.
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involved? Before concluding this introduction some incidents
showing different aspects of solicitation will be mentioned.
Recently in Chicago a detective posed as a professional mur-
derer and was solicited to commit murder. When the plot un-
folded and the arrest was made a long debate ensued between
those responsible for drawing up the indictments in the office of
state's attorney. The question was whether the indictment
should be for the substantive crime of solicitation or for the
specific crime of an attempt to commit murder as proved by the
act of solicitation. Another angle of this matter comes under the
espionage, sabotage, and syndicalism Acts.' An indictment was
sustained in Connecticut against a speaker for the substantive
crime of solicitation for soliciting an audience to commit acts of
violence.3 During the past year a well known French author was
sentenced to five years in prison for soliciting and inciting to inur-
der by means of an article in a revolutionary magazine in which
the assassination of a number of statesmen was advocated. Ma-
hatma Gandhi was arrested for soliciting and inciting his fol-
lowers to "revolt without violence." Another phase of this
problem arises where the accused is charged with soliciting viola-
tion of the prohibition laws.' Is a bootlegger soliciting orders in-
dictable for the solicitation or for an attempt to sell intoxicating
liquor? On account of newspaper publicity national attention
was directed to a Chicago case in which a tenant was arrested for
soliciting his janitor to make a batch of home-brew for him. In a
recent case it was contended that the solicitation of claims dis-
qualified the solicitor to act as a trustee in bankruptcy.' Disbar-
ment proceedings against an attorney hinged upon acts of solici-
tation on his part.6 In New York the promoters of a suicide club
were arrested for soliciting members. A foreign corporation was
charged with failing to pay a business tax and its alleged criminal
liability turned on the question of whether solicitation of business
constituted "doing business" within the meaning of the taxinz
2 See (1931) 72 L. J. 269, Incitement to Mutiny.3State v. Schleifer, (1923) 99 Conn. 432, 121 Ati. 805. Also noted in
(1923) 33 Yale L. J. '98.
4Commonwealth v. Willard, (1839) 22 Pick. (Mass.) 476; Lott v.
United States, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1913) 205 Fed. 28. Cf. United State v.
Farrar, (1930) 281 U. S. 624, 50 Sup. Ct. 425, 74 L. Ed. 1078
5Garrison v. Pilliod Cabinet Co., (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1931) 50 F. (2d)
1035.
(;Matter of Axtell, (1932) 235 App. Div. 350. 257 N. Y. S. 470. See 1
Law, No. 4, p. 4.
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act.7  The proprietor of a bookstore was arrested for soliciting
customers to buy obscene books. A corporation was indicted for
improperly soliciting its employees to vote for a named candidate
for public office. At common law it was a crime to solicit or in-
voke evil spirits to cast a spell or give the evil eye. A newspaper
item states that the Ubangi savages travelling with a circus in the
United States quarreled with their manager and with the aid of
their witch-doctor solicited the evil spirit to kill him. A student
said the tribe should be held for the evil solicitation on account of
its criminal mind. It was further contended since it was criminal
for A to solicit B to murder C it should be criminal for A to
solicit an evil spirit to murder C. Recent cases in California and
Pennsylvania involving witchcraft make an apparent obsolete
matter of more practical importance than it would seem at first
blush. Further discussion will be concerned with the treatises
and the decided cases. As this article primarily deals with solici-
tation as a substantive crime, its scope does not include cases of
libel and slander holding that it is actionable per se to infer by
speaking or writing that a person solicited another to commit a
crime.8 For the same reason the cases holding that solicitation of
sexual crimes does not constitute an assault will be omitted.9
AN ANALYSIS OF THE TREATISES
In Bishop's treatise it is stated that a solicitation is an indict-
able attempt. After a long debate with Wharton on the soundness
of that statement Bishop made the following concession:
"And looking at a note in the American Reports, I am prompt-
ed to say that possibly there may be legal persons who distinguish
between a 'solicitation' and an 'attempt,' deeming both indictable.
Such is not the ordinary language of our books, and I know of no
reason for refusing the name 'attempt' to an indictable solicita-
tion."' 0
After fifty years of writing Bishop retained his original view
and cited seven cases to support it. An examination of those
cases indicates that the first held that soliciting a servant to steal
his master's goods was a misdemeanor ;"1 the second by way of
7See Peebles v. Chrysler Corporation, (D.C. Mo. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 867.
sNewell, Slander & Libel, 4th ed., p. 136; Odger, Libel and Slander,
6th ed.,,pp. 38, 371.
925 L. R. A. 434.
101 Bishop, New Criminal Law, 8th ed., par. 768c and 9th ed., par. 768c.
"Rex v. Higgins, (1801) 2 East 5.
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dicta that solicitation was a substantive crime;12 the third held
that solicitation of a person to burn a barn and furnishing a match
for that purpose constituted an attempt to commit arson ;" in the
fourth it was ruled a misdemeanor for one to write a letter solicit-
ing the commission of adultery;4 the fifth decided that it was a
misdemeanor knowingly to rent a house for purposes of prostitu-
tion;" the sixth reiterated the rule of the first case that solicita-
tion was a misdemeanor although it was decided sixty years later ;'"
and the seventh, contrary to the third, held that solicitation of
arson was a misdemeanor. 17  A recapitulation of Bishop's cases
shows that only one case out of seven supported his view that a
solicitation was an attempt. The case supporting the view of
Bishop was decided in New York in 1843 and held under a gen-
eral attempt statute that a solicitation to commit arson was indict-
able as an attempt to commit arson. Since the case primarily in-
volved a solicitation, it should never have been considered as fall-
ing within the general attempt statute as that statute had not been
passed with the intention of including the crime of solicitation
within its scope. As the courf was interpreting an attempt statute,
it was not necessary to go beyond what had been the settled legal
meaning of the word attempt in relation to the completed crime
and by torture include a solicitation within the statute because
it is one species of the genus attempt. An eminent authority on
statutory law states:
"Indeed, any construction or interpretation of a statute which
goes beyond any of the possible meanings of the language in view
of the case at hand is spurious, and is disapproved generally by
courts and writers in common law jurisdictions.""'
If the accepted common meaning in general usage at the time
the attempt statute was enacted had been considered by the New
York court, a solicitation to commit arson would not have been
held as an attempt to commit that crime. By accepting the in-
sound Bush Case as the backbone of his statement that a solici-
tation is an attempt Bishop misinterpreted the law. The latest
12Rex v. Turvey, (1709) Holt 364.
".People v. Bush, (1843) 4 Hill (N.Y.) 133. See People v. Bloom,
(1912) 149 App. Div. 295, 133 N. Y. S. 708.
14 State v. Avery, (1828) 7 Conn. 266, 18 Am. Dec. 105.
"-Commonwealth v. Harrington, (1825) 3 Pick. (Mass.) 26. Cf.
Brockway v. People, (1842) 2 Hill (N.Y.) 559.16Regina v. Gregory, (1867) L. R. 1 C. C. R. 77, 36 L. J. M. C. 60,
16 L. T. 388, 31 J. P. 453, 15 W. R. 774, 10 Cox C. C. 459.
17 Commonwealth v. Flagg, (1883) 135 Mass. 545.
18De Sloovere, (1932) 9 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 411.
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edition published posthumously contains some statements opposed
to the original view of Bishop. A 1932 edition of \Wharton con-
tains the same questionable statements about the crime of solicita-
tion that were in the previous editions. Wharton states:
"And the better opinion is that, where the solicitation is not in
itself a substantive offense, or where there has been no progress
made toward the consummation of the independent offense at-
tempted, the question whether the solicitation is by itself the sub-
ject of penal prosecution must be answered in the negative.1"
Wharton's view of the law is to be further gleaned from the
following statement in his discussion of arson: "That a bare
solicitation is indictable when there is no overt act may well be
questioned .... "20 Bishop does not agree with Wharton as
Bishop states a solicitation to commit arson is indictable as an at-
tempt to commit arson. In this debate the writer neither agrees
with Bishop nor Wharton. Take a specific example:
Bishop states that a solicitation to commit arson is indictable
as an attempt to commit arson.2 1
Wharton states that it may well be questioned whether a solici-
tation to commit arson is indictable.
The present writer states that a solicitation to commit arson is
a substantive crime and as such indictable.
In the above example it is to be noted that Wharton 2 changes
his view and holds that there is no question about the indictability
if the solicitation is accompanied by other conduct, such as the
payment of money or furnishing the machinery of destruction.2
3
Since the corpus delicti of the crime is the act of solicitation and
the additional conduct is merely collateral evidence, it is difficult
to understand why Wharton considered it as a substantive element
of the crime. If the elements of murder are present the con-
comitant facts are collateral to it; if the crime of solicitation has
been committed the additional conduct should be considered like-
191 Wharton, Criminal Law, 12th ed., par. 218, p. 289.
202 Wharton's Criminal Law, 12th ed., par. 1081, pp. 1373-4.
21fBishop, New Criminal Law, 8th ed., par. 768c and 9th ed., par. 768c.
22Wharton, Criminal Law, 12th ed., par. 1081, p. 1373-4.
2316 C. J. 118, par. 98 likewise incorrectly states: "Of course if solici-
tation is accompanied by some overt act there can be no question as to its
constituting an attempt, but in such a case there is something more than mere
solicitation." In U. of Mo. Bulletin, (1928) Vol. 29, No. 48, page 45 there
is an interesting note on Solicitation to Commit Murder as an Attempt.
At ly. 49 of the aforesaid note is the following interpretation (likewise spur-
ious) : "If defendant had furnished the detective with a revolver, he might
be held to be guilty of an attempt. But the furnishing of a photograph of
the intended victim seems to be quite a different matter."
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wise. But the giving of a match or the payment of money by the
solicitor should not cause the crime to be classified as all attempt
to commit arson instead of solicitation as this would be a joining
together of inconsistencies. Yet another author states:
"There is probably no real difference in criminality between a
solicitation and an attempt.1
2 4
A close examination of the problem indicates there is a vast
difference between the criminality of these crimes. It is one thing
for A to solicit B to shoot C and another matter to have A shoot
at C and miss him. A system of law based upon Christianity could
hardly be said to recognize the same degree of heinousness in acts
basically different. Each crime is composed of different elements.
How could they be said to be the same for the purpose of punish-
ment? A casual glance at the statutory penalties explodes tile
view that the criminality of the two crimes is considered the
same. The penalty for the attempt is often fixed at one-half of
that for the completed crime whereas the penalty for solicitation
is usually less. 5
An examination of the works of May 20, Clark,2T Clark & Mar-
shall,28 and Russell2" on criminal law shows a uniformity of opin-
ion that solicitation is a substantive crime distinct from the crim-
inal attempt. May does not include the solicitation of a small
crime within the class of indictable solicitations, but the others do.
Enough has been gleaned from the treatises to permit a conclu-
sion to the effect that considerable difference of opinion exists
about the scope of the crime of solicitation although the majority
of writers isolated it as a substantive crime at common law. As a
further means of ascertaining the true principle applicable to this
question some of the illuminating cases will be considered.
COMMON-LAW DEVELOPMENT
In early times some instances of solicitation were said to be
within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical court."' A bare solici-
tation was not thought sufficient to generate a substantive crime as
241 McClain, Criminal Law, par. 220.25 New York Penal Law, ch. 41, art. 22, par. 261 is typical of the provi-
sion found in many statutes.2 6May, Criminal Law, 3rd ed., par. 19.27 Clark, Criminal Law, 3rd ed., p. 152.2 8Clark & Marshall, Criminal Law, 3rd ed., par. 130.
291 Russell, Crimes and Misdemeanors, 8th ed., p. 201.
3°Rex v. Pierson, (1706) 1 Salk. 382; 2 Ld. Raym. 1197, Cf. Rigault v.
Gollizard, (1702) Holt 50.
SOLICITATION: A SUBSTANTIVE CRIME
it was said the solicited crime should have been committed. A case
in 1704 seems clear on that point, but nevertheless there were
contrary opinions favoring the view that a bare solicitation was a
substantive crime at common law.3 All uncertainty on this
question was put to rest in 1801 when it was held that bare solici-
tation was a common law misdemeanor.312 The 1704 decision ex-
pressing a contrary view was repudiated and ignored as a misstate-
ment of the law. In passing it is noted that the crime of solicita-
tion paralleled in some respects the historical development of con-
spiracy. At one time it was contended that a bare conspiracy was
not indictable but a conspiracy accompanied by overt acts was
indictable. Finally it came to be held that the gist of the crime
of conspiracy was the agreement of the conspirators, and that
doctrine became the settled law. Today Russell states that the
gist of the crime of solicitation is that the person solicited or in-
cited has not committed the crime.33 A Massachusetts case inter-
prets solicitation at common law as follows: "It is an indictable
offense at common law for one to counsel and solicit another to
commit a felony or other aggravated offense, although the solici-
tation is of no effect."' 34 Referring once again to the landmark
decision in 1801, which is the crux of the question whether solici-
tation is a substantive crime distinct from the attempt, Rex v. Hig-
gins held that soliciting a servant to steal goods from his master
was a misdemeanor. The counsel for the defendant reverted to a
case previously mentioned that was decided in 1704 and contended
that a bare solicitation without other overt acts was merely a fruit-
less temptation and not a crime. LaBlanc, J. said: "A solicitation
or inciting of another, by whatever means it is attempted, is an
act done, and that such an act done with a criminal intent, is
punishable by indictment has been clearly established by the sev-
eral cases referred to."' 35  All that the case involved was a bare
solicitation, and although the judges' reasons differed it was agreed
by all that solicitation was a common law misdemeanor. It is
important to note that the decision did not proceed upon the
theory that the defendant was charged with an attempt to steal.3
3
'Rex v. Collingwood, (1705) 6 Mod. 288, 3 Salk. 42. Cf. Reg. v.
Daniell, (1704) 6 Mod. 99.3
-Rex v. Higgins, (1801) 2 East 5.33Russell, Crimes and Misdemeanors, 8th ed., p. 201.34Commonwealth v. Flagg, (1883) 135 Mass. 545.35Rex v. Higgins, (1801) 2 East 5, 23.36Rex v. Higgins, (1801) 2 East 5. It is only by distorting the decision
that the minority can interpret it as an attempt.
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The doctrine that solicitation is a substantive crime has been uni-
formly upheld by the English courts since the landmark decision
in 1801.1Y A case that shows the distinct earmarks of each crime
is Rex v. Krause.38 In that case a letter soliciting murder was
sent to Johannesburg, but the solicitant never received it." Al-
though the absence of the element of communication precluded
the generation of solicitation, it did not prevent the defendant from
being convicted of an attempt to commit the crime of solicitation.
This decision merits approval as it properly differentiates between
solicitation and attempt and recognizes the individuality of each
crime.40 In a recent article Professor Arnold criticizes the ortho-
dox method of approaching the problem in attempt cases and sug-
gests a new technique for the courts in both attempt and solicita-
tion cases.41 Professor Arnold states: "Nor does the distinction be-
tween solicitation and attempt rest on any such body of respectable
authority that courts are compelled to continue it if they prefer a
more realistic treatment. ' 42  If you concede that each crime must
be kept in its own compartment, how can you justify ignoring the
distinction between them? Throughout the development of the
cases solicitation has properly been isolated from the attempt.4
Often what is relative to one is immaterial to the other.4' In
Stephen's Digest of Criminal Law the matter is summarized as
follows: "Everyone who incites [solicits] any person to commit
any crime commits a misdemeanor whether the crime is or is not
committed." "
UNITED STATES
The development of the crime of solicitation in the United
States differed in some respects from that of England. The fol-
lowing discussion will center around the point of departure and
37Regina v. Gregory, (1867) L. R. 1 C. C. R. 77, upheld that doctrine
after a severe attack.38(1902) 66 J. P. 121, 18 T. L. R. 238. See note on case in (1902) 15
Harv. L. Rev. 672.39(1902) 66 J. P. 121, 18 T. L. R. 238. See note on case in (1902) 15
Harv. L. Rev. 672.40(1902) 15 Harv. L. Rev. 672 in referring to the case states: "The
decision that the solicitation was incomplete seems correct."41(1930) 40 Yale L. J. 53. See page 74 for explanation in detail.
42(1930) 40 Yale L. J. 53, 79.
43Rex v. Collingwood, (1704) 6 Mod. 288, 3 Salk. 42. Rex v. Higgins,
(1801) 2 East 5. Rex v. Gregory, (1867) L. R. 1 C. C. R. 77; Regina v.
Williams, (1845) 1 Den. 39, 4 L. T. 0. S. 454, 9 J. P. 182.44Rex v. Woods, (1930) 143 L. T. 311, 46 T. L. R. 401, 29 Cox C. C.
165, 22 Cr. App. Rep. 41.45Art. 65, 7th ed.
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contrast the principles underlying the conflicting views. In 1843
a New York court went off on a tangent and held under a general
attempt statute that a solicitation to commit arson was indictable
as an attempt to commit arson.46 This was revolutionary doctrine
as it merged the solicitation into an attempt and ignored the sepa-
rate identity of those crimes. As a result of that decision there
arose what is known today as the minority rule. Further impetus
was given to this anomalous doctrine by Bishop's treatise and the
influence of the New York code in other jurisdictions. It should
be observed that in the Bush Case A solicited B to commit arson
and furnished B with a match and promised him a reward. B
ignored A's diabolical scheme and exposed the arsonous plot. It
is well to note that such facts are typical of the crime of solicita-
tion, but due to an erroneous analysis it was considered an attempt
case. It is an example of a conviction for one crime on facts show-
ing another. Nevertheless the Bush Case has been cited favorably
by some courts. Strange as it may seem one court uses the Bush
Case to uphold the doctrine that a bare solicitation is an attempt,
while another court cites it as denying that doctrine. The latter
court points out that in the Bush Case the solicitor promised the
solicitant a reward and furnished him with a match, and hence it
is not a bare solicitation case. A third court says the case was
decided incorrectly originally and that both courts relying on it
are wrong in their interpretation as their conclusions rest upon a
false premise. The third court presents the sound view in the
opinion of the writer as it keeps the two crimes distinct, and if a
solicitation situation is involved it treats the case as one of solicita-
tion even though additional conduct such as an offer of reward
and the furnishing of the machinery of destruction accompany the
solicitation. The additional conduct is considered incidental to
the basic crime. If the facts in the Bush Case had been that A
solicited B to commit arson, the opinion seems to indicate that it
would not have been held an attempt as it was the offering of the
reward and the giving of the match that caused the court to shift
the solicitation into the attempt category. If A solicits B to com-
mit arson the factual situation is basically different from that
where A intending to commit arson lights a torch that is extin-
guished before any damage results. The solicitation is less likely
than the attempt to result in the crime of arson as the solicitation
involves the contingency of the solicitant being unwilling to
46People v. Bush, (1843) 4 Hill (N.Y.) 133.
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become a party to the crime. An authoritative treatise explains
the difference as follows:
"From one point of view it may be said that the term attempt
applies to a person who tries to commit the crime himself, and
the terms solicitation or incitement to the person who tries to get
another to commit the crime, who, if the crime were committed,
would be an accessory before the fact." 7
In the solicitation there is not that dangerous proximity to success
that is found in the attempt. The inherent weakness of the Bash
Case was its failure properly to observe the relation of the attempt
to the completed crime and the difference between solicitation and
attempt. As a contrast to the Bush Case one arising in Minnesota
will be mentioned. It involved a charge of an attempt to commit
extortion based upon a solicitation. The facts showed that A solic-
ited B to commit extortion and paid B expense money for that pur-
pose. Brown, C. J., said:
"Mere acts of preparation are not sufficient, nor does the naked
solicitation of another to commit a crime, unaccompanied by acts
and preparation of the character stated, constitute an attempt with
the meaning of the law."
4
The other angle of the question is likewise shown in a recent Mis-
souri case in which the defendant was charged with an attempt to
commit murder. The defendant had solicited another to commit
the crime and paid $600 in advance and furnished a picture of the
intended victim. The indictment for the attempt to commit mur-
der was not upheld. 9 White, J., said:
"Of course the defendant was guilty of soliciting another to
commit the murder: a -erious crime. but he was not charged with
that, nor convicted of that offense. We must determine cases
upon the law as it is written, and as it has been adjudged for gen-
erations."' 0 Wharton states:
"An attempt is such an intentional preliminary guilty act as
will apparently result in the usual course of natural events, if not
hindered by extraneous causes, in the commission of a deliberate
crime. But this cannot be affirmed of advice given to another,
which such other person is at full liberty to accept or reject."'"
Wharton's interpretation is supported by a large number of deci-
sions. The following statement is typical of many to be found in
the cases: "Merely soliciting one to do an act is not an attempt to
do that act. ' '5 2 A few years after New York's faux pas Michigan
47Russell, Crimes and Misdemeanors, 8th ed., p. 201.48State v. Lampe, (1915) 105 Minn. 65, 154 N. W. 737.
49State v. Davis, (1928) 319 Mo. 1222, 6 S. W. (2d) 609.
5°State v. Davis, (1928) 319 Mo. 1222, 1236, 6 S. W. (2d) 609, 616.
51Wharton, -Criminal Law, 12th ed., par. 1081, p. 1373-4.
52Stabler v. Commonwealth, (1880) 95 Pa. St. 318, 40 Am. Rep. 653.
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had the opportunity of either following the merger theory promul-
gated by New York or walking in the trodden path, and it refused
to adopt the New York rule. The clearness of the analysis makes
it worth quoting as a final answer to the adherents of the opposite
view. The court said:
"The charge in the information is made to rest entirely at last
upon McDade's conduct in soliciting Blaney to burn the ware-
house. The additional circumstance introduced, that he also fur-
nished oil and matches, is not such a one as can be considered an
essential ingredient of the substantive offense intended to be set
forth. The addition of this fact in no manner helps to fill up the
measure required by the statute, and the charge would be as valid
without it as with it. If the provision relied on will support such
a charge as that actually made, it would equally well support one
based on solicitation, and not attended by the incidents introduced
as to the furnishing of oil and matches.""3
The principle stated by the Michigan court in 1872 was a reitera-
tion of the common law rule, and since its enunciation it has been
accepted in most states. 4 The minority rule which merges a solici-
tation into an attempt has been recognized to some extent in
Georgia,55 Massachusetts,5" New York, 7 Oregon,"8 South Caro-
53McDade v. People, (1872) 29 Mich. 50, 51.
54Ex parte Floyd, (1908) 7 Cal. App. 588, 95 Pac. 175; State v.
Schleifer, (1923) 99 Conn. 432, 121 At. 805 (Noted in [1923] 33 Yale L.
J. 98) ; State v. Donovan, (1914) 5 Boyce (28 Del.) 40, 90 Atd. 220; Cox
v. People, (1876) 82 Ill. 191; Commonwealth v. Flagg, (1883) 135 Mass.
545 (Although the counts for solicitation were upheld, it is to be noted that
the counts for the attempt failed as the evidence did not prove the payment.
If payment would have sustained the attempt it would be classed as con-
trary to the orthodox view) ; State v. Lampe, (1915) 131 Minn. 65, 154 N.
W. 737; State v. Davis, (1928) 319 Mo. 1222, 6 S. W. (2d) 609; Cole v.
State, (1917) 14 Ol. Cr. Rep. 18, 166 Pac. 115; Stabler v. Commonwealth,
(1880) 95 Pa. St. 318, 40 Am. Rep. 653; Hicks v. Commonwealth, (1889)
86 Va. 223, 9 S. E. 1024; State v. Butler, (1894) 8 Wash. 194, 35 Pac.
1093; United States v. Galleanni, (D.C. Mass. 1917) 245 Fed. 977. Cf.
State v. Baller, (1885) 26 W. Va. 90, 53 Am. Rep. 66; Walsh v. People,
(1872) 65 Ill. 58, 16 Am. Rep. 569; United States v. DeBolt, (D.C. Ohio
1918) 253 Fed. 78; Wiseman v. Commonwealth, (1925) 143 Va. 631, 130 S.
E. 249; State v. Quinlan, (1914) 86 N. J. L. 120, 91 Atl. 111; Lee v. Stan-
fill, (1916) 171 Ky. 71, 186 S. W. 1196; State v. Sullivan, (1904) 110 Mo.
App. 75, 84 S. W. 105; United States v. Lyles, (C.C. Dist. of Col. 1834) 4
Cranch C. C. 469, Fed. Cas. No. 15646; People v. Most, (1902) 171 N. Y.
423, 64 N. E. 175; People v. Hammond, (1903) 132 Mich. 422, 93 N. W.
1084. See Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, (1898) 6 Pa. Super. Ct. 405 for
a good discussion as to whether solicitation should be limited to felonies.
55Griffin v. State, (1858) 26 Ga. 493.
56Commonwealth v. Peaslee, (1901) 177 Mass. 267, 59 N. E. 55.57People v. Bush, (1843) 4 Hill (N.Y.) 133; People v. Mills, (1903)
41 Misc. Rep. 195, 83 N. Y. S. 947; McDermott v. People, (1861) 5 Park.
Crim. Rep. (N.Y.) 102. In Mulligan v. People, (1861) 5 Park. Crim. Rep.
(N.Y.) 105, 112 one finds: "He might be said to have attempted murder
had he solicited another person to shoot the officer." Where there is a
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lina,"9 and Tennessee. 0 In a recent interpretation of this question
by a Missouri court it was stated: "Therefore in conformity with
the weight of authority, we hold that merely soliciting one to com-
mit a crime does not constitute an attempt."'" In passing it is to
be noted that the queries propounded in the introduction relative
to the inconsistent views now extant have in a sense been answered
in the previous analysis. The development of the cases indicates
that the failure of the courts to isolate the crime of solicitation and
agree upon its common legal meaning has been the prime cause of
a three-fold classification instead of a uniform one. By confusing
the popular meaning of attempt and solicitation with the scientific
and historical meaning, solicitation has been considered a substan-
tive crime in one instance, an attempt in another, and no crime in
the third. Furthermore, the failure to isolate each crime explains
to some extent why the additional conduct accompanying a solicita-
tion, such as the payment of money or the furnishing the machin-
ery of destruction, is classified by some courts as an attempt instead
of a solicitation. Before summarizing a glance will be taken at
the statutes relating to solicitation.
STATUTORY ASPECTS OF SOLICITATION
An examination of the statutes indicates that California is one
of the few jurisdictions that has a basic general statute on solicita-
tion in its penal code. It reads:
"Every person who solicits another to offer or accept or join
in the offer or acceptance of a bribe, or to commit or join in the
commission of murder, robbery, burglary, grand theft, receiving
stolen property, extortion, rape by force or violence, perjury. sub-
ornation of perjury, forgery or kidnapping, is punishable by im-
prisonment in the county jail not longer than one year or in the
state prison not longer than five years, or by fine of not more than
five thousand dollars. Such offence must be proved by the testi-
mony of two witnesses, or of one witness and corroborating cir-
cumstances.
'62
Three points to be noted about the above statute are: first that
statutory provision covering the specific act of solicitation, thc confusion
ceases: People v. Meola, (1920) 193 App. Div. 487, 184 N. Y. S. 353.
58State v. Taylor, (1906) 47 Or. 455, 84 Pac. 82.
59State v. Bowers, (1892) 35 So. Car. 262, 14 S. E. 488.
6
°Collins v. State, (1870) 3 Heisk, (Tenn.) 14.
6 1State v. Davis, (1928) 319 Mo. 1222, 1229, 6 S. W. (2d) 609, 612,
by Davis, C.
62California, Penal Code, (Deering) 1931, par. 653f, p. 399.
SOLICITATION: A SUBSTANTIVE CRIME
solicitation is a distinct crime, second that solicitation is distin-
guished from attempt, third that the penalties for the crime of
solicitation are generally less than for the attempts. Illinois is
typical of other states that do not have a basic general solicitation
statute like that of California. In this group a few aspects of
solicitation are covered by separate enactment. Illinois is similar
to California in that it holds solicitation is a distinct crime. As the
common law prevails in Illinois when no other provision is made
by statute, solicitation is considered a common law misdemeanor.
In states in which the common law has been abolished it often
happens that solicitations which would be criminal are considered
non-criminal on account of statutory omission. New York resem-
bles Illinois in that it has no basic general solicitation statute and
only occasionally provides for specific kinds of solicitation. It has
often placed solicitations in the class of criminal attempts, but
Illinois has never followed New York's example in this respect
It appears that New York tortured its attempt statute in order to
include solicitations within it and thus established an unusual prece-
dent. New York invariably classifies a solicitation as falling
within its attempt statute while California revolts at such practice.
Oklahoma is like New York in that it considers only those acts
crimes which are within its penal code, but it differs from New
York in that it does not extend its attempt statute to include
solicitations. Like New York it differs from Illinois in that it has
abolished the common law of crimes, and thus it permits a non-
criminal classification of solicitations which might otherwise be
criminal. Probably that explains why Oklahoma and New York
sometimes indict for an attempt on evidence showing solicitation.
Although the four states just mentioned presented some varia-
tions typical of those jurisdictions, it appears that statutory solici-
tation is generally of two types. The first, a basic one of the
general class similar to the statute in California ; the second type,
a specific one covering a particular act of soliritation suchi a ;
found in the federal statutes"4 and in a large number of the states."a
63California, Penal Code, (Deering) 1931, par. 653f, p. 399. Cf. I
Philippine, Penal Code, 1930, art. 4, p. 19.
6435 Stat. at L. 1110, Crim. Code, secs. 118-122.65Alabama, Code, 1928, par. 3467, p. 569; Iowa, Code, 1924, sec. 12894
and 12917; Illinois, Rev. 5tat., 1931, ch. 38 (Crim. Codc) pars. 144 and
238; Missouri, Rev. Stat., 1929, sec. 3898; Texas, Penal Code, sec. 588%
(11); Utah, Laws, par. 7919: Wyoming, Comp. Stat., 1920. sec. 7087 and
7325; Georgia, Code, 1926, par. 384.
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The statutory analysis also showed that as a general rule the crime
of solicitation is penalized less severely than the criminal attempt
in parallel instances."
CONCLUSION
In England and the United States the solicitation of any crime is
generally considered a misdemeanor except in cases where it has
been made a felony by statute. A few jurisdictions in the United
States qualify this rule by holding that the solicitation of minor
misdemeanors is not criminal. In states where the common law
has been abolished and solicitation is exclusively statutory it is
usually classified as a misdemeanor except where it is provided
that it is a felony. And in statutory jurisdictions where there is
not a general solicitation statute only those solicitations specifically
provided for by special act are criminal.
In the United States but not in England there is a further
classification. If the solicitation is accompanied by additional con-
duct such as payment or offering of a reward or furnishing the
machinery of destruction (i. e., guns or matches) the majority
rule holds that the resulting crime is solicitation while a fading
minority repudiate that interpretation and improperly merge the
solicitation into an attempt and prosecute for that crime instead of
the solicitation.
All solicitations to commit crime should be considered criminal
as the solicitor of either a major or minor crime tends to cause a
breach of the peace that is highly prejudicial to the general wel-
fare. The theory that criminal solicitation should only extend to
felonies was early exploded, and that is also true of the hypothesis
that the rule extended to malum in se crimes but not to maluni pro-
hibitum offences. A multitude of citations indicate it is criminal
to solicit the commission of any crime.
GGArizona. Rev. Code, 1928, par. 4896, p. 1105; California, Penal Code
(Deering) 1931, par. 664, p. 405 which should be considered with par. 653f,
p. 399 and par. 216, p. 99; Connecticut, Gen. Stat., 1931, sees. 6071, 6093.
6099, 6165, 6173; Georgia, Code, 1926, par. 1066, p. 2126; Maine, Rev. Stat.,
1930, p. 1641; Michigan, Ann. Stat.. (Howell) sec. 14976; 2 Mason's 1927
Minn. Stat., par. 9930; Missouri, Rev. Stat., 1929, sec. 4442; New York,
Penal Law, ch. 41, art. 22, par. 260-262 (Gilbert's Ann. Cr. Code & Penal
Law, 1930) ; 1 Oklahoma. Stat., 1931, ch. 15, art. 7, p. 669-670 (sec. 1822) ;
1 Oregon, Code Ann., 1930, sec. 14-1009, p. 1392; Tennessee, Code, 1923.
sec. 10801; Virginia, Code Ann., 1930, par. 4767; West Virginia, Code, 1931.
par. 8; 1 Washington, Stat. (Remington) 1922, par. 2264.
